APC · Bola Ahmed Tinubu

The APC has published its programme. It is specific on exports and industry, and silent on debt and the region.

The ruling party presented “From Reforms to Prosperity” on 7 November 2026. It is the first frontline programme scored against the six tests. As the party in government, the APC also faces a second test the others cannot: what it delivered against the programme it ran on in 2023.

Wole Ogundare, Founder and Managing Partner, Carthena AdvisoryUpdated 9 November 2026

1 · The programme

Programme published

From Reforms to Prosperity (Agenda 2027-2031)

109 pages, presented 7 November 2026

Presented by the candidate at the party’s Port Harcourt rally.

2 · Carthena’s assessment against the six tests

56.0out of 100 on Carthena’s weights

1Dollar generation5/6 · 20.8/25

2Fiscal room for industrial policy2/6 · 6.7/20

3Terms of capital3/6 · 10.0/20

4Strategic sector position5/6 · 12.5/15

5Regional anchoring1/6 · 2.0/12

6Geopolitical positioning3/6 · 4.0/8

Each criterion scores 2 when the programme commits to an action with the means and a target or date, 1 when it states an intention without them, and 0 when it says nothing or works against the aim. Each test scores 0 to 6 and is weighted to a total out of 100. Move the weights on the main page and the ranking recomputes.

On Carthena’s weights the programme scores 56 out of 100. Its best marks are on earning dollars and on industrial strategy, the two areas this standard weighs most. It describes the country’s capital problem the same way this publication does: of the US$23.22 billion of foreign capital recorded in 2025, only US$923 million was direct investment in businesses. It also plans transmission around where factories need power, rather than promising megawatts in the abstract.

Its weakest area is the public finances. On the IMF’s projection, interest will take 53.7 per cent of federal revenue in 2026, yet the programme never mentions interest or the cost of servicing debt. Its plan for revenue is to recover money the state already loses, with no measure named and no amount estimated.

On the region it says almost nothing. ECOWAS does not appear anywhere in its 109 pages, although Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have left the bloc and now tax its goods. The only commitment is to keep talking to the three states, and the African free trade agreement appears only in the list of past achievements.

On the terms Nigeria sets for investors, the programme takes the right position each time but names a working tool only once. It wants local value added, warns against relying on short-term portfolio money and invites local investors into infrastructure. The one tool it names for pension savings, a mortgage fund, puts that money into housing rather than into factories or infrastructure.

1 Dollar generation

weight 25

1
1.1 A quantified target for non-oil foreign exchange earnings, with a timetable.
“At least US$15 billion a year, with cocoa butter at US$1 billion”p. 79, progress table, non-oil exports
The programme puts a number on non-oil exports and names the tools to reach it: export credit, factoring and market access deals (p. 75). It does not say by when. Every other target in the same table carries a year, and the test asks for one.
2
1.2 An explicit treatment of the balance between portfolio and direct investment, and what the programme does to shift it.
“Total foreign capital importation reached US$23.22 billion in 2025, but only US$923 million was classified as FDI; the bulk was portfolio capital.”p. 74; target p. 79
The programme states the problem plainly: most of the foreign money that arrived in 2025 was short-term portfolio money, not investment in businesses. It sets a target of at least US$5 billion a year of direct investment and promises an audited register of where that money goes (p. 79).
2
1.3 A named instrument on remittances, services exports or both, beyond an expression of intent.
“Digital services, finance, engineering, creative work, software and professional services will have distinct export-financing, skills, regulatory and market-entry strategies rather than being treated as merchandise trade.”p. 75; target p. 18
Services exports get their own financing, skills, regulatory and market-entry strategies (p. 75) and a target of one million export-linked jobs by 2030 (p. 18). Remittances get one line about better data on Nigerians abroad (p. 91).

2 Fiscal room for industrial policy

weight 20

0
2.1 States a trajectory for debt service as a share of revenue, with a target.
The programme never mentions interest payments or the cost of servicing debt. It cites a debt-to-GDP ratio of 36.85 per cent as evidence of prudence (p. 95) and a bond issue to clear arrears owed to power generators (p. 58), but sets no target for either.Whole document; pp. 58, 95
Interest is projected to take more than half of federal revenue in 2026. A four-year plan that does not say how that share will come down has no answer to the country’s tightest fiscal constraint.
1
2.2 Names a revenue measure with an estimated yield.
“Fund it first from what we already lose. Recover and protect public value, from oil revenue to electricity billing and project completion, so that progress rests less on new taxes and new borrowing.”p. 93
The programme says it will fund itself first from money the state already loses, in oil revenue, unpaid electricity bills and abandoned projects. It names no specific measure and does not estimate how much any of this would raise.
1
2.3 Names an expenditure reduction with a figure attached, rather than a commitment to cut waste.
“Complete the outstanding Oronsaye mergers to lock in lasting savings”p. 89
It promises to finish merging overlapping agencies and to audit unfinished public projects (p. 88), but puts no figure on the savings from either.

3 Terms of capital

weight 20

1
3.1 Commits to attaching local content, technology transfer or supplier linkage conditions to foreign investment.
“Access to incentives and protection will be linked to improved productivity, locally embedded supply chains, value addition and measurable export competitiveness.”p. 77
Investors will get incentives and protection only if they add value locally, buy from Nigerian suppliers and export competitively. That is the right condition, but it applies to all investors rather than to foreign investment, and it sets no thresholds or dates.
1
3.2 States a position on managing volatile capital flows, in either direction.
“A surplus financed only by oil, temporary import compression or volatile portfolio inflows is not the intended industrial outcome.”p. 78
The programme says it does not want a trade surplus propped up by short-term portfolio money. Its only response is to watch the figures. It names no tool to slow such money down or to cushion the economy when it leaves.
1
3.3 Names an instrument to move domestic pension, insurance or savings capital into productive assets.
“Capitalise MREIF toward N1 trillion, with pension-fund participation, to deliver 20-year fixed-rate mortgages nationwide”p. 49
The only tool named for pension money is a mortgage fund that pension funds are invited to invest in. Housing finance has merit, but it does not move pension savings into factories, farms or infrastructure, which is what the test asks.

4 Strategic sector position

weight 15

1
4.1 Names the contested sectors Nigeria will compete in, and by implication those it will not.
“We will focus industry policy on investable national value chains: software, data and creative services; critical minerals, mining services, steel and aluminium; gas-to-fertilisers, methanol, petrochemicals and industrial energy; agro-processing, food manufacturing and sugar; cotton, textiles and garments, footwear and leather; plastics, packaging, pulp, paper and fast-moving consumer products.”p. 77
The programme names its priority sectors, each with a pipeline of anchor projects. But the list runs to more than a dozen industries, from software and steel to sugar, footwear and packaging. A list that long is not a choice: it does not tell investors or officials where Nigeria will concentrate its limited money and attention.
2
4.2 Commits to moving beyond extraction or assembly in at least one named sector, and names the mechanism.
“In minerals, beneficiation and transparent traceability must enable value added in Nigeria rather than the shipment of low-value ores.”p. 77; targets p. 79
It commits to processing minerals in Nigeria rather than exporting raw ore, and backs this with targets: 10 million tonnes of crude steel a year by 2030 and at least 30 per cent value added on processed farm exports (p. 79).
2
4.3 Ties power, logistics or digital infrastructure to the named sectors, rather than listing infrastructure generically.
“Transmission reinforcement, the Presidential Power Initiative, network automation and investment in industrial feeders will be programmed against demand from factories, agro-processing zones, technology parks and export-processing facilities.”p. 73; target p. 79
Transmission upgrades are to be planned around where factories and processing zones need power, with dedicated, metered supply to industrial clusters reported every quarter (p. 73). The target is at least 7,500 MW of average generation by 2031 (p. 79).

5 Regional anchoring

weight 12

1
5.1 A named response to the Sahel states’ departure and the duty they now levy on bloc goods.
“keep diplomatic, trade and security channels open with our Sahel neighbours, building on the 2024 Niger security agreement and the August 2026 Maiduguri Sahel retreat”p. 91
The programme promises to keep talking to Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. It does not mention that they have left ECOWAS or that they now tax goods from the bloc, and it does not mention ECOWAS at all.
0
5.2 An AfCFTA implementation commitment with a date, going beyond ratification.
The programme makes no commitment on the African Continental Free Trade Area for the next term. It mentions the agreement only when listing past achievements (p. 64).Commitments, pp. 73 to 79
Past achievements, such as faster certificates of origin, are not a plan for the next four years.
0
5.3 Commits to sharing something Nigeria has built, in payments, identity or power, with the region.
Nothing in the programme offers to share Nigerian payment, identity or power systems with neighbouring countries.Whole document
Identity and digital systems are discussed only as services for Nigerians.

6 Geopolitical positioning

weight 8

1
6.1 States who Nigeria aligns with, on what, and where it stays non-aligned.
“deepen Nigeria’s role as a BRICS partner country (since January 2025), pursue participation in the G20 and a seat on the UN Security Council”p. 91
The programme lists the memberships and seats it wants: BRICS partner, the G20, the UN Security Council. It does not say which countries Nigeria will side with on which issues, or where it will stay neutral.
1
6.2 Names different partners for different sectors, rather than a single relationship.
“Deepen defence research, technology transfer agreements, and private capital co-investment through strategic regional and international defence industrial partnerships.”p. 29
Partners for particular sectors, such as the United States on critical minerals and the UAE and China on trade, appear only as past deals (pp. 64, 69). The commitments for the next term name no partners.
1
6.3 Treats energy self-sufficiency as a security question and not only a price question.
“Launch full implementation of the National Protection Policy and Strategy for Critical National Assets, with real-time surveillance across energy pipelines, electrical power grids, railways, schools, and health facilities.”p. 28
Pipelines and the grid are treated as assets to guard against attack. Producing enough of Nigeria’s own fuel and power is presented as a matter of cost and supply, not of national security.

3 · Is it enough?

The targets against the scale of the need

Not scored. The scale above rewards a precise commitment whether or not it is big enough to matter. This section asks whether it is.

At least US$15bn of non-oil exports a year p. 79

Non-oil exports grew from US$4.5 billion in 2023 to US$6.1 billion in 2025, about 16 per cent a year. Growing at the same rate would reach US$15 billion by 2031, so the target asks for no improvement on the current pace. Even at US$15 billion, non-oil exports would be worth about US$63 per Nigerian. Vietnam exports goods worth US$4,676 per person.

NEPC; World Bank, Non-oil export performance; World Development Indicators, 2023 to 2025. Carthena’s calculation. Growth rates and the per-person figure are Carthena’s calculations, using the World Bank population of 237,527,782 from Exhibit 1. The programme gives no year for the target; 2031 is the end of the programme period.

At least US$5bn of recorded foreign direct investment a year p. 79

The programme measures foreign investment with the statistics bureau’s figures, which recorded only US$923 million of direct investment in 2025. On that measure, US$5 billion looks like a fivefold increase. The central bank’s balance of payments, which also counts profits that foreign firms reinvest in Nigeria and which this publication uses, recorded US$2.18 billion in the first half of 2026 alone, or about US$4.4 billion a year. Against that figure the target asks for a modest increase.

Central Bank of Nigeria; National Bureau of Statistics, Balance of Payments Statistics; Nigerian Capital Importation, first half of 2026; 2025. Carthena’s calculation. The two series are not interchangeable; see the note under Exhibit 2 on the main page. The programme does not say which basis its target uses. The annual rate is Carthena’s calculation: twice the half-year figure.

At least 7,500 MW of sustained average generation by 2031 p. 79

Nigeria has 13,625 MW of generating capacity installed. In the second quarter of 2026 the grid generated an average of 4,022 MW and distribution companies received 3,197 MW. Reaching 7,500 MW would still leave almost half of installed capacity producing nothing. The target also measures generation only, and says nothing about how much power reaches homes and businesses.

Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission, Second Quarter 2026 Report, published 29 September 2026. Carthena’s calculation. The unused share is Carthena’s calculation: 1 minus 7,500 divided by 13,625. Some installed capacity is unavailable rather than idle.

4 · Delivery to date

The ruling party’s second test

This verdict is separate from the score. The rules of evidence leave a government’s record out of the scoring, because only one candidate has a record in office to judge. As the governing party, the APC is judged on it here instead, and the result does not change its score. Promises are from Renewed Hope 2023: Action Plan for a Better Nigeria; outcomes are from official sources only.

It passed the laws it promised but missed its targets for results.

The 2023 manifesto made 27 commitments that fall within the six tests. Two were delivered in full, the Electricity Act and the new tax laws, and both were laws the government could pass on its own. The fuel subsidy was removed, but the promised account of where the savings went has not been published. Of the targets for results that can be checked so far, from oil production to electricity metering and broadband, none was met.

This matters for 2027 because the new programme’s best marks rest on targets of the same kind: US$15 billion of non-oil exports and US$5 billion of direct investment a year. Several 2023 targets reappear in the new programme with later deadlines, the oil production target has been cut, and ECOWAS has been dropped.

2Delivered

4Partly

8Missed

1Reversed

3No record found

7Not measurable

2Open

2023 promise	What happened	Verdict	In the 2027 programme
Review the corporate tax system and create a progressive tax regime, without raising taxes in a weak economy.2023, p. 16 · Test 2	Four tax reform laws were signed in June 2025 and came into force on 1 January 2026.Federal Republic of Nigeria, Nigeria Tax Act 2025; Nigeria Tax Administration Act 2025, signed 26 June 2025.	Delivered	Built on.
Review the Electric Power Sector Reform Act 2005 and reform the sector’s governance.2023, p. 32 · Test 4	The Electricity Act 2023 was signed in June 2023, devolving market regulation to the states.Federal Republic of Nigeria, Electricity Act 2023, June 2023.	Delivered	Built on.
Remove the fuel subsidy and dedicate the money saved to infrastructure, agriculture and social programmes.2023, p. 37 · Test 2	The subsidy was removed on 29 May 2023. No public account of where the savings went has been published; the 2027 programme itself promises to publish one (p. 89).Federal Government of Nigeria, Presidential inaugural address; 2027 programme p. 89, 29 May 2023.	Partly	Repeated: the account of savings is promised again.
End multiple exchange rates and build “a stronger, more stable Naira”.2023, p. 19 · Test 1	Windows unified on 14 June 2023. The official rate was ₦464.51 per dollar on 26 May 2023 and ₦1,347.94 on 2 November 2026: about 66 per cent of the naira’s official dollar value was lost. The 2023 rate was administered, with the parallel market near ₦750 to ₦770, so part of the fall was the end of an overvalued official rate.Central Bank of Nigeria, Official window closing rates, as reported, 26 May 2023 and 2 November 2026. Carthena’s calculation. The May 2023 rate is from the Investors and Exporters window, reported by The Conclave. The percentage fall is Carthena’s calculation: 1 minus 464.51 divided by 1,347.94.	Partly	Does not mention the naira’s value; reports instead that the gap between official and street rates has narrowed.
Enable distribution companies to charge cost-reflective tariffs.2023, p. 31 · Test 2	Band A customers only, since April 2024. Of the ₦1.928 trillion subsidy required for 2025, ₦76.95bn had been paid, about 4 per cent.Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission, Tariff orders; subsidy data compiled by the Association of Power Generation Companies, April 2024 and October 2026. Carthena’s calculation. The 4 per cent share is Carthena’s calculation.	Partly	Repeated, with “explicit, fiscally funded support” (p. 73).
“Export more and import less, strengthening both the naira and our way of life.”2023, p. 3 · Test 1	Formal non-oil exports rose from US$4.5bn in 2023 to US$6.1bn in 2025. Cocoa beans (US$1.99bn) and urea (US$1.29bn), which is made from gas, were 54 per cent of the 2025 total.Nigerian Export Promotion Council, Annual non-oil export performance, 2023 and 2025. Carthena’s calculation. The 54 per cent share is Carthena’s calculation from the NEPC product breakdown.	Partly	Raised: at least US$15bn a year, with no year attached (p. 79).
New foreign-currency debt “will be linked to projects that generate cash flows from which the debt can be repaid”.2023, p. 21 · Test 2	A US$2.35bn Eurobond was priced in November 2025. The Debt Management Office states the proceeds finance the 2025 budget deficit and other financing needs.Debt Management Office, Media statement on the US$2.35bn Eurobond, reported by Nairametrics, 5 November 2025. The DMO’s own page for the statement no longer loads at its original address; this report quotes it.	Missed	Dropped. The programme instead cites strong investor demand for the Eurobond as a sign of confidence (p. 95).
Crude production of 2.6 million barrels a day by 2027 and 4 million by 2030.2023, p. 35 · Test 1	1.56 million barrels a day in June 2026, the highest since April 2020. The regulator’s national target is now 3 million by 2030.Nigerian Upstream Petroleum Regulatory Commission, Monthly production report; statement by the Commission Chief Executive, June and July 2026. Crude oil as measured against the OPEC quota.	Missed	Lowered: a “medium-term target of three million” (p. 60).
Full deregulation of midstream gas prices within six months.2023, p. 36 · Test 4	The regulator still sets the domestic base price for gas to power: US$2.18 per MMBtu from 1 April 2026.Nigerian Midstream and Downstream Petroleum Regulatory Authority, Domestic base price circular, 1 April 2026.	Missed	Not mentioned.
“gas resources shall be directed, as a #1 priority to Nigerian power generation”2023, p. 32 · Test 6	In January and February 2026, 45.8 per cent of utilised gas was exported and about 27 per cent was sold in the domestic market.Nigerian Upstream Petroleum Regulatory Commission, Monthly gas data, analysed by ThisDay, January and February 2026.	Missed	Dropped. Growth in gas exports is reported as an achievement (p. 60).
Get more of the power already generated to consumers, from the manifesto’s 2022 baseline of “a maximum of 4,500MW” distributed.2023, p. 30 · Test 4	Distribution companies received an average of 3,197 MWh/h in the second quarter of 2026, against 4,022 MWh/h generated onto the grid and 13,625 MW installed.Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission, Second Quarter 2026 Report, published 29 September 2026. Energy received by distribution companies, not generation. The same figure is used in Exhibit 6 on the main page. The 2022 baseline is a stated maximum and the 2026 figure a quarterly average, so the comparison is indicative; average generation of 4,022 MWh/h is also below it.	Missed	Raised: at least 7,500 MW sustained average by 2031 (p. 79).
End estimated billing and meter every connection “within the shortest possible time frame”.2023, p. 30 · Test 4	At the end of June 2026, 4.85 million of 12.59 million active customers had no meter: 61.51 per cent were metered.Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission, Metering data, first half of 2026, end-June 2026.	Missed	Rolled forward: full metering by 2030.
Develop major and minor industrial hubs in each geopolitical zone, each with a stated focus.2023, pp. 22 to 23 · Test 4	Building-materials hubs in six zones were announced in August 2024 as a call for investors. None is reported operating.Federal Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, Ministerial announcement, 4 August 2024.	Missed	Rolled forward: “a flagship industrial hub in each geopolitical zone” (p. 18).
Deliver the National Broadband Plan, described in the manifesto as broadband services to 90 per cent of the population by 2025.2023, p. 51 · Test 4	The plan targeted 70 per cent broadband penetration, with coverage reaching 90 per cent of the population, by end-2025. Penetration was 55.67 per cent in April 2026.Nigerian Communications Commission, Industry statistics, reported by ThisDay, April 2026.	Missed	Rolled forward: 125,000 km of fibre backbone (p. 79).
Higher interest rates against supply-driven inflation “will only weaken the patient”; monetary policy “must complement fiscal goals”.2023, pp. 18, 20 · Test 2	The policy rate rose from 18.5 per cent in May 2023 to 27.5 per cent in November 2024, and was cut to 23 per cent in September 2026.Central Bank of Nigeria, Monetary Policy Committee decisions, May 2023 to September 2026. The CBN sets rates independently. The row is included because the 2023 manifesto stated a position on rates and said monetary policy must complement fiscal goals.	Reversed	Not mentioned.
Replace oil-price budgeting with growth-based budgeting under “a clear and mandatory inflationary ceiling on spending”.2023, p. 14 · Test 2	No statute, amendment to the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2007 or bill creating such a ceiling was found. The 2024 and 2025 budgets were instead extended and revised.National Assembly, Federal legislation and budget records, searched, November 2026. Absence of a record, not proof that nothing happened.	No record found	Not mentioned.
Require international oil companies to assign a share of revenues to technology transfer to indigenous companies.2023, p. 35 · Test 3	No directive, regulation or law to this effect was found. Local content still rests on the NOGICD Act 2010, and indigenous gains came from asset sales rather than a mandate.NUPRC, NCDMB and the Presidency, Releases and directives, searched, November 2026. Absence of a record, not proof that nothing happened.	No record found	Dropped.
Establish a G-5 of major African nations to develop common positions.2023, p. 72 · Test 6	No such grouping was established or proposed in office.Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Presidency, Releases, searched, November 2026. Absence of a record, not proof that nothing happened.	No record found	Dropped.
Cap spending on government buildings and on the pay of elected and senior executive officials.2023, p. 17 · Test 2	No cap or figure was specified, so there is nothing to test.All Progressives Congress, Renewed Hope 2023, October 2022.	Not measurable	Replaced by the Oronsaye mergers, with no figure.
Raise the indigenous share of crude production to over 1 million barrels a day by 2027.2023, p. 35 · Test 3	No official volume series exists. Industry sources put indigenous firms at about 60 per cent of output, which is not an official measure.Nigerian Upstream Petroleum Regulatory Commission, No official series, November 2026.	Not measurable	Not mentioned; the programme reports instead that oil majors have sold onshore fields to Nigerian firms.
One million new jobs in the ICT sector within the first 24 months.2023, p. 49 · Test 1	No official count of ICT jobs exists. Reported programmes measure people trained, not jobs created.National Bureau of Statistics, No official series, November 2026.	Not measurable	Rolled forward: one million export-linked jobs by 2030 (p. 18).
Within ECOWAS, increase sub-regional trade and promote joint industrialisation and infrastructure.2023, p. 71 · Test 5	No official series on intra-ECOWAS trade since 2023 was found to test the promise. The bloc itself shrank: Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, all under military rule, left with effect from 29 January 2025, during Nigeria’s chairmanship.ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government, Decision on the withdrawal of three member states, December 2024, effective 29 January 2025.	Not measurable	Dropped: ECOWAS is not mentioned.
Lead Africa in seeking reform of the WTO and the international financial institutions.2023, p. 71 · Test 6	No target was set, so there is nothing to test.All Progressives Congress, Renewed Hope 2023, October 2022.	Not measurable	Replaced by BRICS partnership and bids for the G20 and the Security Council (p. 91).
Halve youth unemployment within four years.2023, p. 57 · Test 1	The National Bureau of Statistics changed its labour-force method in 2023, so no comparable series exists.National Bureau of Statistics, Nigeria Labour Force Survey, methodology revised 2023.	Not measurable	Rolled forward to 2031.
Raise cultivated arable land from 35 to 65 per cent within four years.2023, pp. 26, 29 · Test 4	No official series measures this.Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security, No official series, November 2026.	Not measurable	Dropped.
Increase gas production by 20 per cent.2023, p. 36 · Test 4	Output was 6.91 bcf/d in 2022 and 6.84 in 2024, so the 2023 base was about 6.8 to 6.9 and the target about 8.2. Output averaged 7.61 in 2025 and 7.93 in May 2026, about 15 to 16 per cent above base and flat on a year earlier.Nigerian Upstream Petroleum Regulatory Commission, Annual and monthly gas production data, 2022 to May 2026. Carthena’s calculation. The 2023 base is bracketed by the 2022 and 2024 annual figures; the percentages are Carthena’s calculation. May 2026 and May 2025 monthly figures: NUPRC, reported by Nairametrics, 16 June 2026.	Open	Reports gas growth using its own figures.
Complete the critical gas pipelines, including AKK, OB3, ELPS II and the Trans Nigeria line, by 2027.2023, p. 36 · Test 4	None is in full service. The AKK main line was completed in December 2025, with connections due in 2026. OB3 completed its River Niger crossing in April 2026 with no completion date given. ELPS II compressor stations were 94.88 per cent built in May 2026.NNPC Limited and its gas infrastructure company, Press releases and progress report to NMDPRA, December 2025 to May 2026. OB3: NNPC, 30 April 2026. AKK: NNPC, reported by Nairametrics, 29 December 2025. ELPS II: NGIC progress report to NMDPRA, reported by ThisDay, 29 June 2026.	Open	Reports how far each pipeline has progressed.

15 of the 27 commitments have a definite verdict. “No record found” records a search of official and parliamentary sources and is not proof that nothing happened. “Not measurable” means the promise set no target or no official series exists to test it. “Open” means the deadline has not passed.