CARTHENAADVISORY
A Financial and Management Advisory Firm
Edition 01  ·  Nigeria  ·  October 2026
The standard, published before the scoring

Six tests for 2027

Nigeria votes on 16 January 2027 with eighteen candidates on the ballot. This sets out what the country needs from whoever wins, measured against UNCTAD’s framework rather than any party’s. Every programme will be scored against it in December.

This is part one of two. The standard is published now, in full, so that it is fixed before any programme is read and so that campaigns can write against it. Scoring opens in December, on this page, once the manifestos exist. The rubric below does not change after today.
The question that is not on the ballot

Nigeria does not have an investment problem. It has an earnings problem.

In the first half of 2026 Nigeria took in $2.18bn of direct investment and $13.12bn of portfolio investment. Six dollars arrived looking for yield for every dollar that arrived to build something. Reserves stood at $54.86bn on 24 September 2026, the highest they have ever been, and almost none of that strength was built by selling anything to anybody.

The ratio widened as the half went on, from just under six times in the first quarter to just over six in the second.

That distinction is the whole argument. Money that arrives looking for yield leaves when the yield goes. Money that arrives to build a factory stays because it cannot easily do anything else. Nigeria has spent three years getting very good at attracting the first kind, and the headline numbers reward it for doing so. Portfolio investment liabilities were minus $5.03bn in the first quarter of 2025, a net divestment the Central Bank’s own release described as a record outflow. That is what it looks like when the money goes.

UNCTAD’s Trade and Development Report 2026 describes the world those numbers sit inside. Industrialisation and merchandise trade, the two ladders every developed country climbed, no longer carry the weight they did. Value is concentrating in sectors governments now treat as national security questions, and developed economies capture roughly 70 per cent of global greenfield investment in all of them except critical minerals. The terms of entry have changed, and a country that has not noticed will keep running a strategy for a world that has moved.

The six tests below come from that report’s conclusions. None of them asks what a government will spend. All of them ask what the country will be able to do.

EXHIBIT 1

Nigeria earns $242 of goods exports per person per year

Vietnam earns 19 times as much. The comparison is not with Switzerland; it is with countries that were poorer than Nigeria within living memory.

Malaysia
$7,698
Vietnam
$4,676
South Africa
$1,798
Indonesia
$981
Egypt
$358
Nigeria
$242

World Bank, World Development Indicators, BX.GSR.MRCH.CD and SP.POP.TOTL, 2025. Carthena’s calculation. Nigeria is $57.49bn of goods exports across a population of 237,527,782. The division is Carthena’s. The population is a World Bank estimate; Nigeria has had no census since 2006. WDI values for the current year are revised.

Set that beside what arrives from outside. The shape of the inflow is not a detail of the balance of payments; it is the country’s economic strategy, stated in the only language that cannot be rewritten in a speech.

EXHIBIT 2

In the first half of 2026 Nigeria took in six dollars of portfolio money for every dollar of direct investment

Direct investment builds something and stays. Portfolio money arrives at a yield and leaves when the yield turns. Nigeria is attracting six times more of the kind that leaves.

Portfolio investment
$13.12bn
Direct investment
$2.18bn

Central Bank of Nigeria, Balance of Payments Statistics, quarterly highlights, first half of 2026, second quarter released September 2026. Carthena’s calculation. Liabilities, which are inflows. The half year is Carthena’s sum of two published quarters: direct investment $1.03bn in the first and $1.15bn in the second, portfolio investment $6.03bn and $7.09bn. These are balance of payments figures and count profits earned in Nigeria and reinvested rather than repatriated. The National Bureau of Statistics capital importation series counts only capital arriving through Nigerian banks, excludes those reinvested earnings, and reports a smaller direct investment figure as a result. The two are not interchangeable and this publication uses the CBN throughout.

A country that cannot earn foreign exchange has to borrow it, and a country that borrows it spends its revenue on interest rather than on anything a voter would recognise.

EXHIBIT 3

Interest alone now takes more than half of federal government revenue

This is interest, not total debt service. Adding principal repayments makes it worse. Industrial policy in the UNCTAD framework runs on grants, state loans and investment rules, and none of those is affordable from what is left.

40.8%
2024 actual
53.2%
2025 estimate
53.7%
2026 projection
52.4%
2027 projection

IMF, 2026 Article IV Consultation with Nigeria, June 2026. The IMF row reads "FGN interest payments (percent of FGN revenue)". This is interest only; it excludes principal. Most Nigerian coverage reported it as debt servicing, which overstates the claim. The denominator is federal government revenue, not consolidated general government.

The usual answer is that Nigeria must collect more tax, and the usual answer is right. What the usual answer leaves out is the distance involved.

EXHIBIT 4

Nigeria collects 8.2 per cent of GDP in tax, half the African average

The government’s own target is 18 per cent. Reaching the African average alone would require more than doubling collection as a share of the economy.

South Africa
26.5%
Vietnam
16.8%
Africa average
16.1%
Kenya
15.8%
Ghana
14.5%
Egypt
13.6%
Indonesia
12.0%
Nigeria
8.2%

OECD, ATAF and AUC, Revenue Statistics in Africa 2025, Table 4.1, and Revenue Statistics in Asia and the Pacific 2025, Table 3.1, 2023, the most recent comparable year. Total tax revenue as a percentage of GDP, including social security contributions. OECD’s Nigeria figure covers federal and state revenue only; local government is excluded. Nigeria’s own NBS computation, last published for 2021, gives 10.86 per cent on a wider revenue base and the pre-rebasing GDP series. The African average is unweighted across 38 countries.

The part nobody campaigns on

Nigeria already has the capital. It is lending it to the government.

There is ₦31.8 trillion in Nigerian pension assets, and ₦17.8 trillion of it, fifty-six per cent, sits in federal government securities. Another ₦5.5 trillion sits in insurance. This is the country’s own long-term savings, the patient money that every development story in the UNCTAD report is financed by, and it is currently funding the deficit rather than building anything that would close it.

That is not a failure of the pension industry, which is doing exactly what the risk rules and the available instruments tell it to do. It is a failure to create anything else worth buying. No candidate has to find this money. It is already here, and it is already Nigerian.

EXHIBIT 5

Where Nigeria’s long-term savings actually sit

₦31.80 trillion of pension assets, and the single largest use of it is lending to the federal government.

Federal government securities₦17.80trn · 56.0%
Domestic equities₦6.32trn · 19.9%
Other assets₦4.41trn · 13.9%
Money market instruments₦3.27trn · 10.3%

National Pension Commission (PenCom), Monthly Industry Summary, August 2026, 31 August 2026. Carthena’s calculation. Unaudited. Total ₦31,802,243.65m; FGN securities ₦17,801,087.15m, which is 55.97 per cent. 11.39 million retirement savings account holders. Shares are Carthena’s calculation from the published allocations.

The same pattern repeats in power, where the problem is not what has been built but what reaches anybody. Nigeria has 13,625 MW of installed grid capacity. It generates about 4,022 MW onto the grid, and distributors take delivery of about 3,197 MW. Every strategic sector in the UNCTAD framework, data centres above all, is an electricity business before it is anything else.

EXHIBIT 6

Of the grid capacity Nigeria has already paid for, 23 per cent reaches a distributor

Each step down the chain loses something. The gap between what is installed and what is delivered is the clearest measure of whether an infrastructure promise is a construction problem or an operating one.

Installed capacity
13,625 MW
Available capacity
4,454 MW
Generated onto grid
4,022 MW
Received by distributors
3,197 MW

Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission, Second Quarter 2026 Report, published 29 September 2026. Carthena’s calculation. Installed capacity across 28 grid-connected plants. Average available capacity 4,454.17 MW at a plant availability factor of 32.69 per cent. Average on-grid generation 4,022.40 MWh/h. Energy received by distribution companies 3,197.03 MWh/h. NERC publishes these as four distinct measures: generation is not delivery, and conflating them overstates delivery by about a quarter. Ratios to installed capacity are Carthena’s calculation.

$242
Nigerian goods exports per person, 2025. Vietnam: $4,676
6x
Portfolio against direct investment, first half of 2026, on the CBN balance of payments
53.7%
Of federal revenue going to interest alone, 2026 projection
215 TCF
Gas reserves on a 2P basis, the largest unconverted asset Nigeria holds
51%
Nigeria's share of ECOWAS GDP, down from 77% in 2019 across the same twelve countries
The instrument

Six tests

Each test is answerable from a published document. Each carries a benchmark Carthena did not author. Each resolves to three criteria, scored on three points: the programme commits, the programme gestures, or the programme is silent.

TEST 1

Dollar generation

Can Nigeria earn foreign exchange rather than rent it?

Every other ambition is downstream of this one. A country that does not earn dollars borrows them, and the borrowing shows up as interest consuming the revenue that would have paid for everything else.

  • 1.1A quantified target for non-oil foreign exchange earnings, with a timetable.
  • 1.2An explicit treatment of the balance between portfolio and direct investment, and what the programme does to shift it.
  • 1.3A named instrument on remittances, services exports or both, beyond an expression of intent.

Benchmark: in the first half of 2026 Nigeria took in $2.18bn of direct investment against $13.12bn of portfolio investment, six to one, on the CBN balance of payments. Nigeria earns $242 of goods exports per person per year against Vietnam’s $4,676. UNCTAD on commodity dependence, which affects two-thirds of the developing world.

TEST 2

Fiscal room for industrial policy

Industrial policy runs on financial instruments. Does Nigeria have room to use any?

UNCTAD finds that developed economies run industrial policy through grants, state loans and investment rules at a scale developing countries cannot match, which is why developing countries outside China fall back on trade policy. Nigeria’s room is close to nil.

  • 2.1States a trajectory for debt service as a share of revenue, with a target.
  • 2.2Names a revenue measure with an estimated yield.
  • 2.3Names an expenditure reduction with a figure attached, rather than a commitment to cut waste.

Benchmark: interest alone at 53.7 per cent of federal revenue in 2026, IMF projection. Tax at 8.2 per cent of GDP against an African average of 16.1 per cent.

TEST 3

Terms of capital

Does Nigeria set conditions on investment, or take it on any terms?

The highest return per unit of political cost of the six. Conditioning investment requires no money, only the willingness to set terms, and Nigeria already holds the domestic capital it keeps saying it lacks.

  • 3.1Commits to attaching local content, technology transfer or supplier linkage conditions to foreign investment.
  • 3.2States a position on managing volatile capital flows, in either direction.
  • 3.3Names an instrument to move domestic pension, insurance or savings capital into productive assets.

Benchmark: UNCTAD is explicit that developing states can condition foreign investment on linkages, technology transfer and local value added. Nigeria conditions none of these outside oil and gas. Pension assets of ₦31.8trn, 56 per cent of it in federal government securities.

TEST 4

Strategic sector position

Where does Nigeria intend to compete, and what does it intend to own?

High value and long horizon, which is why it sits below the three above. A president cannot build a semiconductor industry in four years. A president can decide which sectors the country is actually trying to enter, and stop pretending about the rest.

  • 4.1Names the contested sectors Nigeria will compete in, and by implication those it will not.
  • 4.2Commits to moving beyond extraction or assembly in at least one named sector, and names the mechanism.
  • 4.3Ties power, logistics or digital infrastructure to the named sectors, rather than listing infrastructure generically.

Benchmark: developed economies capture roughly 70 per cent of global greenfield investment in strategic sectors; developing economies lead only in critical minerals, where they export before adding value. Nigeria holds 215.19 TCF of gas on a 2P basis and exports LNG equivalent to about 67 per cent of nameplate capacity. Distributors receive 23 per cent of installed grid capacity.

TEST 5

Regional anchoring

Nigeria is the only West African state with the scale to anchor the region. What holds it?

Live and urgent, and Nigeria is losing the region by default rather than by decision.

  • 5.1A named response to the Sahel states’ departure and the duty they now levy on bloc goods.
  • 5.2An AfCFTA implementation commitment with a date, going beyond ratification.
  • 5.3Commits to sharing something Nigeria has built, in payments, identity or power, with the region.

Benchmark: Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger left ECOWAS effective 29 January 2025 and now levy a 0.5 per cent duty on goods from the bloc, humanitarian aid excepted. UNCTAD on rising economies anchoring regionalism by sharing what they have built, with India’s digital public infrastructure shared across 23 countries and Brazil’s Pix extended across South America. Measured across the twelve countries still in the bloc, Nigeria’s share of ECOWAS GDP has fallen from 77 per cent in 2019 to 51 per cent in 2026.

TEST 6

Geopolitical positioning

Does Nigeria have a declared doctrine, or does it hedge by accident?

Real, and the most declaratory of the six. Scored because a country that has never written down who it aligns with on what will keep discovering its position by surprise.

  • 6.1States who Nigeria aligns with, on what, and where it stays non-aligned.
  • 6.2Names different partners for different sectors, rather than a single relationship.
  • 6.3Treats energy self-sufficiency as a security question and not only a price question.

Benchmark: UNCTAD on sectoral multi-alignment, worked through the Türkiye case. Countries hedge across sectors, cooperate with competitors on technology, and pursue autonomy in energy. Positioning is itself a form of agency.

Rules of evidence

What counts, and what does not

RuleApplication
AdmissibleThe candidate’s own published programme. A party manifesto the candidate’s document adopts. Any policy paper formally issued by the campaign.
Not admissibleSpeeches, rally commitments, interviews, social media, press reporting of intentions, and the record in office.
Why the record is excludedSeventeen of the eighteen candidates have never held the presidency. Evidence that exists for one and not the others breaks the instrument.
Scoring windowDocuments published up to and including Friday 4 December 2026, so every candidate is read on the same window.
No published programmeRecorded as such and displayed as its own state. Not scored zero, which would wrongly imply a document that failed.
Evidence trailEvery score resolves to a quotation and a page reference, visible on the scorecard.
Double scoringEach criterion scored independently twice, disagreements settled against the text rather than by discussion.
AmendmentNone. A criterion that proves unworkable is voided publicly, never rewritten.
Weighting and scoring

Carthena’s weights, and yours

Two questions set each weight: how much the thing is holding Nigeria back today, and how much a president can change it in four years. The defaults are Carthena’s and are stated. Move them and the instrument changes with you.

Weight the six tests

25
20
20
15
12
8

These are Carthena’s weights, set out in the rubric above. Move any control to see the instrument under your own assumptions.

CARTHENA POSITION
Your weighting · Edition 01
Distribution of 100 pointsnormalised to 100
  • Dollar generation25
  • Fiscal room for industrial policy20
  • Terms of capital20
  • Strategic sector position15
  • Regional anchoring12
  • Geopolitical positioning8

You have put dollar generation first. That is a bet that nothing else is possible until the country earns its own dollars.

What a government pursuing these priorities would have to deliver by 2031, on the figures in this edition.

Dollar generation. Goods exports per person would have to move off $242. Reaching even Egypt’s $358 means roughly $27.5bn more earned abroad every year, and it has to come from somewhere other than crude.

Fiscal room for industrial policy. Interest would have to come off 53.7 per cent of federal revenue. Getting it to the mid-twenties means tax at roughly 14 per cent of GDP, which is where Ghana is, or a materially smaller debt stock, or both.

Terms of capital. Every significant foreign investment would carry local content, technology transfer or supplier conditions, as oil and gas already does, and ₦17.8trn of pension money would have to move out of federal paper into assets that build something.

You have put geopolitical positioning last. Nigeria keeps discovering its position by surprise, one external shock at a time.

The Carthena Position, Edition 01carthenaadvisory.com/position/nigeria-2027

Scoring opens in December. The rubric above is fixed from today; the scores below are not yet filled, because the programmes they judge do not yet exist.

Evidence cut-off4 December 2026
Election16 January 2027
AARufai Adekunle Omo-AjeRunning mate: Shehu Hussaini
No published programme
AACOmoyele SoworeRunning mate: Haruna Garba Magashi
No published programme
ADCAtiku AbubakarRunning mate: Chibuike Rotimi Amaechi
No published programme
ADPAbbas-Bin AliyuRunning mate: Ike Chinazam
No published programme
APCBola Ahmed TinubuRunning mate: Kashim Shettima
No published programme
APMOluseyi Abiodun MakindeRunning mate: Musa Lawal Daura
No published programme
APPYusuf KabiruRunning mate: Ofordile Peace Egobia
No published programme
BPSunday AdenugaRunning mate: Usman Turaki Mustapha
No published programme
DLAMoses Olusoji AdebisiRunning mate: Nafisat Usaku Abubakar
No published programme
LPSunday Chibuzo OkerekeRunning mate: Hajja Bintu Konto
No published programme
NDCPeter Gregory ObiRunning mate: Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso
No published programme
NDPAda Elizabeth Fredrick OkworiRunning mate: Uchenna Anthony Chukwuemeka
No published programme
NRMNkem Esther OkerekeRunning mate: Nasir Muhammed Sulaiman
No published programme
PDPSandy Ojang OnorRunning mate: Babangida Umaru
No published programme
PRPDonald DukeRunning mate: Kabiru Rabiu
No published programme
SDPAdewole Ebenezer AdebayoRunning mate: Usman Muhammed Bugaje
No published programme
YPPPeter Ada AgadaRunning mate: Patience Ndidi Key
No published programme
ZLPDaniel Daberechukwu NwanyanwuRunning mate: Khalid Hassan
No published programme

This is the Independent National Electoral Commission’s final list of presidential candidates, September 2026. Spellings and running mates are taken from press renderings rather than from the Commission’s own document, and are being checked against it before scoring opens.

Sources
  • UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report 2026: The Geoeconomics of Development, chapter III. Framework for all six tests; the 70 per cent greenfield concentration figure; sectoral multi-alignment.
  • Central Bank of Nigeria, provisional balance of payments statistics, Q2 2026, released September 2026. Direct investment $1.03bn in Q1 and $1.15bn in Q2; portfolio investment $6.03bn and $7.09bn. Half-year totals are Carthena’s addition.
  • Central Bank of Nigeria, Balance of Payment Highlights, Q1 2025. Portfolio investment liabilities of minus $5.03bn, described in the release as a record outflow.
  • National Bureau of Statistics, Nigerian Capital Importation, Q1 2026, released 3 June 2026. Cited for comparison only. No figure in this edition is drawn from it. The note under Exhibit 2 explains why the two series are not interchangeable.
  • World Bank World Development Indicators, BX.GSR.MRCH.CD and SP.POP.TOTL, 2025. Goods exports per head across all six countries.
  • OECD, ATAF and AUC, Revenue Statistics in Africa 2025, Table 4.1, and Revenue Statistics in Asia and the Pacific 2025, Table 3.1. Tax-to-GDP, 2023.
  • IMF, 2026 Article IV Consultation with Nigeria, June 2026. Interest as a share of federal revenue, 2024 to 2027.
  • National Pension Commission, unaudited industry portfolio report, 31 August 2026. Pension assets of ₦31.80trn and their allocation.
  • Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission, Second Quarter 2026 Report, September 2026. Installed capacity, available capacity, on-grid generation and energy received by distributors, which the report publishes as four distinct measures.
  • Nigerian Upstream Petroleum Regulatory Commission, reserves statement as at 1 January 2026. Gas reserves of 215.19 TCF, declared on a 2P basis of proven plus probable. The 1P figure is lower and is not quoted here.
  • ECOWAS GDP shares are Carthena’s calculation. The 2026 share uses IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2026, nominal projections; the 2019 share uses World Bank NY.GDP.MKTP.CD actuals. Both are nominal current US dollars, and both are measured across the twelve countries remaining in the bloc after the Sahel states left, so the membership change does not drive the fall. The 2026 leg is sensitive to the WEO vintage.
  • Independent National Electoral Commission, final list of presidential candidates, September 2026.